Seguir
S. Matthew Weinberg
S. Matthew Weinberg
Assistant Professor, Princeton University
Dirección de correo verificada de princeton.edu - Página principal
Título
Citado por
Citado por
Año
On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward
M Carlsten, H Kalodner, SM Weinberg, A Narayanan
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications …, 2016
4012016
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 113, 97-115, 2019
306*2019
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts
H Kalodner, S Goldfeder, X Chen, SM Weinberg, EW Felten
27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), 1353-1370, 2018
2682018
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier, SM Weinberg
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 67 (4), 1-40, 2020
2302020
Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 130-139, 2012
2112012
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2012
1782012
Pricing lotteries
P Briest, S Chawla, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Journal of Economic Theory 156, 144-174, 2015
147*2015
Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
PD Azar, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 118, 511-532, 2019
134*2019
A duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design
Y Cai, NR Devanur, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
1332016
Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity
A Rubinstein, SM Weinberg
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 6 (3-4), 1-25, 2018
1262018
Bitcoin: A natural oligopoly
N Arnosti, SM Weinberg
Management Science 68 (7), 4755-4771, 2022
1202022
Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 618-627, 2013
1032013
Formal barriers to longest-chain proof-of-stake protocols
J Brown-Cohen, A Narayanan, A Psomas, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 459-473, 2019
1022019
cambridge, UK: Univ
S Weinberg
Pr, 1995
961995
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 370-387, 2012
95*2012
Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Approximation algorithms and other generalizations
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2013
742013
Optimal and efficient parametric auctions
P Azar, S Micali, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2013
692013
Lectures on Particles and Field Theory
S Weinberg
Brandeis Summer Institute in Theoretical Physics 2, 289, 1964
611964
Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons
M Braverman, J Mao, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
592016
The sample complexity of up-to-ε multi-dimensional revenue maximization
YA Gonczarowski, SM Weinberg
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 68 (3), 1-28, 2021
582021
El sistema no puede realizar la operación en estos momentos. Inténtalo de nuevo más tarde.
Artículos 1–20