| Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems Ç Kayı, E Ramaekers Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1), 220-232, 2010 | 44 | 2010 |
| Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn Social Choice and Welfare 43, 603-633, 2014 | 12 | 2014 |
| Allocation rules on networks R İlkılıç, Ç Kayı Social Choice and Welfare 43, 877-892, 2014 | 10 | 2014 |
| On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn Social Choice and Welfare 42, 793-811, 2014 | 10 | 2014 |
| Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn Games and Economic Behavior 82, 693-701, 2013 | 5 | 2013 |
| Strategic and normative analysis of queueing, matching, and cost allocation Ç Kayı University of Rochester. Department of Economics, 2007 | 5 | 2007 |
| Corrigendum to “Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems”[Games Econ. Behav. 68 (1)(2010) 220--232] C Kayi Games and Economic Behavior, 2015 | 4 | 2015 |
| On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many–to–Many Matching Markets. Barcelona Graduate School of Economics P Jaramillo, C Kayı, F Klijn Working Paper 632, 2012 | 4 | 2012 |
| The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn International Journal of Game Theory 48, 157-179, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| Allocation rules on networks R Ilkilic, C Kayi Serie Documentos de trabajo; No. 118, 2012 | 3 | 2012 |
| School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn Journal of Mathematical Economics 95, 102496, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
| School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms P Jaramillo, C Kayi, F Klijn Documento CEDE, 2017 | 1 | 2017 |
| Consistency and the sequential equal contributions rule for airport problems Y Chun, C Kayı, CH Yeh METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 2008 | 1 | 2008 |
| An impossibility in sequencing problems E Ramaekers, Ç Kayi | 1 | 2008 |
| An impossibility in sequencing problems C Kayi, E Ramaekers | 1 | 2008 |
| Consistency and the sequential equal contributions rule for irrigation problems Y Chun, C Kayı, CH Yeh mimeo, 2006 | 1 | 2006 |
| Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems P Jaramillo, C Kayi, F Klijn Documento CEDE, 2017 | | 2017 |
| Equilibria Under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare (Equilibrios bajo el mecanismo de aceptaci´ on diferida: Estrategias de eliminaci´ on … P Jaramillo, C Kayi, F Klijn Documento CEDE, 2013 | | 2013 |
| Equilibria Under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare PJ Vidales, C Kayi, F Klijn Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2013 | | 2013 |
| Equilibria Under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare [preprint] P Jaramillo, C Kayi, F Klijn Documentos CEDE, ISSN: 1657-7191, No. 23 (Abril, 2013); pp., 2013 | | 2013 |
Flip KlijnScientific Researcher (IAE-CSIC) and Research Professor (Barcelona School of Economics)Verified email at iae.csic.es
