Cagatay Kayi
Cagatay Kayi
Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía
Dirección de correo verificada de urosario.edu.co - Página principal
Título
Citado por
Citado por
Año
Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
Ç Kayı, E Ramaekers
Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1), 220-232, 2010
372010
Allocation rules on networks
R İlkılıç, Ç Kayı
Social Choice and Welfare 43 (4), 877-892, 2014
102014
Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn
Social Choice and Welfare 43 (3), 603-633, 2014
102014
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn
Social Choice and Welfare 42 (4), 793-811, 2014
72014
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn
Games and Economic Behavior 82, 693-701, 2013
52013
Corrigendum to" Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems"[Games Econ. Behav. 68 (1)(2010) 220-232]
Ç Kayi, E Ramaekers
Games and Economic Behavior, 2015
42015
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms
P Jaramillo, C Kayi, F Klijn
Documento CEDE, 2017
32017
Strategic and normative analysis of queueing, matching, and cost allocation
Ç Kayı
University of Rochester. Department of Economics, 2007
32007
The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
P Jaramillo, Ç Kayı, F Klijn
International Journal of Game Theory 48 (1), 157-179, 2019
12019
Consistency and the sequential equal contributions rule for airport problems
Y Chun, C Kayı, CH Yeh
METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 2008
12008
Consistency and the sequential equal contributions rule for irrigation problems
Y Chun, C Kayı, CH Yeh
mimeo, 2006
12006
Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems
P Jaramillo, C Kayi, F Klijn
Documento CEDE, 2017
2017
Equilibria Under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare (Equilibrios bajo el mecanismo de aceptaci´ on diferida: Estrategias de eliminaci´ on …
P Jaramillo, C Kayi, F Klijn
Documento CEDE, 2013
2013
Equilibria Under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare
PJ Vidales, C Kayi, F Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2013
2013
Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint
PJ Vidales, C Kayi, F Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2012
2012
On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-many Matching Markets
PJ Vidales, C Kayi, F Klijn
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2012
2012
Documentos CEDE
S Jaramillo
2011
Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
E Ramaekers, C Kayi
CORE Discussion Papers, 2008
2008
An impossibility in sequencing problems
E Ramaekers, Ç Kayi
2008
An impossibility in sequencing problems
à Kayi, R Eve
Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology …, 2008
2008
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Artículos 1–20