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Ophir Friedler
Ophir Friedler
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The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.08821, 2016
322016
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
Operations Research 69 (1), 188-206, 2021
252021
A unified framework for strong price of anarchy in clustering games
M Feldman, O Friedler
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 601-613, 2015
172015
99% revenue via enhanced competition
M Feldman, O Friedler, A Rubinstein
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 443-460, 2018
142018
Control flow error localization
O Friedler, W Kadry, A Nahir, V Sokhin
US Patent 9,251,045, 2016
142016
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets
T Ezra, M Feldman, O Friedler
ACM SIGecom Exchanges 18 (2), 38-44, 2020
112020
Simple mechanisms for agents with complements
M Feldman, O Friedler, J Morgenstern, G Reiner
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 251-267, 2016
112016
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements: Abstract
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 17 …, 2017
102017
Architectural failure analysis
O Friedler, W Kadry, A Nahir, V Sokhin
US Patent 9,569,345, 2017
102017
Effective post-silicon failure localization using dynamic program slicing
O Friedler, W Kadry, A Morgenshtein, A Nahir, V Sokhin
2014 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 1-6, 2014
102014
Convergence to strong equilibrium in network design games
M Feldman, O Friedler
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 43 (3), 71-71, 2015
22015
Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements
M Feldman, O Friedler, J Morgenstern, G Reiner
arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.07939, 2016
12016
Simple Auctions for Agents with Complements
O Friedler, G Reiner
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