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James Andow
James Andow
Dirección de correo verificada de manchester.ac.uk - Página principal
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Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy
F Cova, B Strickland, A Abatista, A Allard, J Andow, M Attie, J Beebe, ...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1), 9-44, 2021
2102021
Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy
J Andow
Philosophical Psychology 29 (8), 1128-1141, 2016
542016
How 'Intuition' Exploded
J Andow
Metaphilosophy 46 (2), 2015
432015
Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan
J Andow, F Cova
Philosophical Psychology, 2015
252015
Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions
J Andow
Philosophical Psychology 29 (6), 904-911, 2016
232016
How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?
J Andow
Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5), 515-538, 2015
222015
Fully experimental conceptual engineering
J Andow
Inquiry, 1-27, 2020
202020
Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions
J Andow
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1), 105-125, 2016
192016
Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection
P Roberts, J Andow, K Schmidtke
Erkenntnis 79 (5), 1173-1189, 2014
192014
Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism
J Grindrod, J Andow, N Hansen
Mind & Language 34 (2), 158-182, 2019
182019
Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable
J Andow
dialectica 69 (2), 205-220, 2015
152015
Conceptual engineering is extremely unlikely to work. So what?
J Andow
Inquiry 64 (1-2), 212-226, 2021
142021
Aesthetic testimony and experimental philosophy
J Andow
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics 1, 2018
142018
Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?
J Andow
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1), 115-141, 2018
142018
Why don't we trust Moral Testimony?
J Andow
Mind and Language, 2019
132019
Abduction by philosophers: reorienting philosophical methodology
J Andow
Metaphilosophy 47 (3), 353-370, 2016
112016
Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?
J Andow
Synthese, 1-13, 2016
102016
Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)
J Andow
Inquiry 66 (6), 1036-1068, 2023
92023
What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience
K Allen, P Quinlan, J Andow, E Fischer
Mind & Language 37 (5), 814-839, 2022
92022
English language and philosophy
J Tallant, J Andow
The Routledge Handbook of English Language and Digital Humanities, 440-455, 2020
92020
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Artículos 1–20